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The Poetics of the Pragmatic: What Literary
Criticisms of Law Offers Posner
Guyora Binder*
Is it practical to evaluate law aesthetically, as if it were a kind of literature?
In reviewing Literary Criticisms of Law,' Judge Richard Posner argues that it is
not instrumentally useful to view law as a kind of literature.2 He thereby
reasserts his long-held position that law should be evaluated economically
rather than aesthetically.' In this response, I argue that Posner's pragmatism
requires that he evaluate law aesthetically, if he wishes to evaluate it at all.
Famous as a tireless promoter of conservative law and economics, Judge
Posner has more recently restyled himself as an equally energetic exponent of
"pragmatism," 4 thereby placing himself in the unlikely company of such
progressive social critics as Richard Rorty, Cornel West, Margaret Radin, and
Stanley Fish.5  This has been a welcome development. Pragmatism is an
appealingly flexible doctrine that makes the test of any action or belief the
difference it makes in practice. Pragmatism asks us to compare the
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. Thanks are owed to
Robert Weisberg, George Kannar, and Jim Wooten for helpful suggestions.
1. GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW (2000).
2. Richard A. Posner, What Has Modem Literary Theory to Offer Law? 53 STAN. L.
REV. 195 (2000) (book review).
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION 16, 140-41, 144-46, 150 (1988) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE]
(identifying science, economics, and law with mature acceptance of the constraints of reality
and of social authority, and identifying law and literature scholarship, literary romanticism,
literary modernism, and Nietzsche with infant narcissism, aestheticism, and political
radicalism); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 387-405 (1995) (same).
4. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 3, at 4-15; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 227-65 (1999) [hereinafter POSNER,
PROBLEMATICS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 26-33, 239-44,
308, 384-87, 454-69 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE].
5. See Richard A. Posner, What has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, in PRAGMATISM IN
LAW AND SOCIETY 29-46 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) [hereinafter
PRAGMATISM] (discussing Posner's agreements and disagreements with these scholars); see
generally Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, Richard
Rorty, and Ronald Dworkin, in PRAGMATISM, supra, 47-82; Margaret Jane Radin, The
Pragmatist and the Feminist in PRAGMATISM, supra 127-54; Richard Rorty, The Banality of
Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in PRAGMATISM, supra, at 89-98; Comel West, The
Limits of Neopragmatism, in PRAGMATISM, supra, 121-26.
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consequences of any action or claim with the consequences of available
alternative actions or claims. But unlike other consequentialist doctrines, such
as utilitarian policy analysis or verificationist epistemology, pragmatism does
not prescribe further criteria for comparing alternative bundles of
consequences.6 It treats the justification of action and belief as a matter of
situated practical judgment and denies that justification must rest on a
foundation of indubitable knowledge.
Judge Posner's pragmatic turn has placed a rhetorically able and visible
advocate in the service of this sensible doctrine. It has helped him think
through the complex practical responsibilities of his role as a judge, while
tempering his claims for efficiency analysis and adulterating that analysis with
other values. 7 It has coincided with a great broadening in his intellectual
interests, and in his articulated values and sympathies. It has produced one
very good book of legal philosophy, The Problems of Jurisprudence,8 and
another containing many excellent arguments, The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory,9 which is, however, marred by an intemperate tone. Pragmatism
has benefited Judge Posner in many respects, but it has not overcome one
disabling idiosyncrasy: His persistent antipathy toward the humanities seems
to blind Judge Posner to the role of aesthetic value in practical judgment and
justification. It also impedes his ability to assess, or even absorb, the argument
Robert Weisberg and I offered in Literary Criticisms of Law.
In his recent review of Literary Criticisms of Law, Judge Posner reiterates
his long-held position that literary theory is irrelevant to law. Offering our
book as an example, Judge Posner characterizes scholarship applying literary
theory to law as an unpragmatic, even "decadent" enterprise, pursued only by
enervated leftists left behind by the march of free enterprise. Readers of his
review essay do not learn that Literary Criticisms of Law offers a pragmatic
critique of the law and literature field more extensive, but more balanced, than
Judge Posner's own. More importantly, readers do not learn about our
argument that a literary analysis and evaluation of law is indispensable to the
kind of pragmatic jurisprudence Judge Posner professes to favor.
In the balance of this essay, I explicate the polemical impulses that appear
to have shaped Judge Posner's crabbed reading of our book. And I argue that a
pragmatic jurisprudence, whether progressive or conservative, must recognize
6. See DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL THEORY
110-217 (1985) (comparing utilitarianism and pragmatism in political theory); RICHARD
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 306-11, 336-38 (1979) (giving a
pragmatic critique of verificationism).
7. See, e.g., POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 26 ("I shall argue... against
overarching conceptions of justice such as... 'wealth maximization'-though not against
modest versions of these normative systems ... .
8. Id.
9. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 4.
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that law cannot be viewed simply as an instrument. Law is the art of
composing society, and normative legal argument therefore is a rhetoric of
aesthetic value, properly understood as a kind of cultural criticism.
In Literary Criticisms of Law, Robert Weisberg and I critiqued scholarship
applying the theory and methods of literary studies to law. We showed that
much literary criticism of law is flawed by one of two unpragmatic premises:
the skeptical premise that legitimate law must rest on objective foundations, 10
and the sentimental premise that it must fully appreciate the feelings of its
subjects." We also showed that some scholarship attempts to parry both
skeptical and sentimental critiques with a genteel authoritarianism that calls on
legal decisionmakers to present their own refined characters as symbols of the
law's virtue.'2 We argued that these vices of skepticism, sentimentalism, and
authoritarianism often depend on simplistic caricatures that reduce literature to
a metaphor for irrationality, sympathy, or refinement. We added that in
portraying literature as necessarily subverting, correcting, or saving law,
literary criticism of law also mischaracterizes law as crudely mechanical. By
thus opposing literature to law, such scholarship tends to obscure the
expressive and aesthetic concerns inherent in making, using, and evaluating
law.
Along with these criticisms of the field, we offered a program for reform.
A more illuminating literary criticism of law, we concluded, would explicate
and evaluate the expressive meaning and effects of law. It would acknowledge
legal institutions as constitutively important elements in a culture, and strive to
understand, evaluate and improve their cultural consequences. 3 While our
approach draws on "cultural studies" and "the new historicist" literary
criticism, our aim is not to urge the application of a particular literary theory to
law, but to insist that any adequate normative theory of law's legitimacy and its
purposes must read and evaluate law's meaning. We argued not simply for a
cross-disciplinary importation of literary theory into law, but for a genuinely
interdisciplinary cultural criticism of law.
Our argument for thus integrating literature and law relied on capacious
10. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 16-17, 462.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 17-18.
13. Id. at 18-19, 26,462-539. See also Binder & Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law,
49 STAN. L. REV. 1149 (1997) (arguing that legal disputes are forums for contesting and
claiming identities and that legal rules defining markets necessarily involve cultural
representations of wealth and worth-as well as of competent market actors); Richard H.
Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the
Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936 (1991) (claiming that different legal mechanisms for
distributing public burdens and benefits imply different values and confer different identities
on the recipients even when policymakers do not intend these expressive effects, and arguing
that public policy analysis should consider these expressive effects).
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conceptions of both. Strictly speaking, literature is language presented or
appreciated for the aesthetic experience of its sense and sound. Figuratively
speaking, however, any activity is "literary" that involves creatively expressing
and arranging meanings. That law is a discursive enterprise increases the
plausibility of the law-as-literature trope, but law, like drama, creates meaning
through action as well through language. Legal scholars have likened aspects
of law to such diverse literary practices as interpretation, narration, dramatic
performance, rhetorical figuration, lyric self-expression, and mimetic
representation.14 In Literary Criticisms of Law, we view any practice as literary
in so far as it makes new social meanings out of received cultural materials,
and presents them for expressive or aesthetic purposes. 5
We argued that literature, thus conceived, is inherent in law, which we
conceived as the activity of making and justifying legal institutions, laws, legal
claims, and legal decisions. We include within law the reasons, large and small,
appealed to in making legal decisions and arguments. Thus, law includes
claims about the ultimate purposes (liberty, public welfare, self-government,
moral perfection) and founding origins (divine will, contract, majority will,
heroic sacrifice, crisis resolved, evil overcome) that legitimate legal institutions
and systems.' 6 When law is defined in these broad terms, "legal"
decisionmaking is not the narrow preserve of the judiciary or the legal
profession. Legal decisionmakers of course include the legislators who make
and officials who apply law. But legal decisionmakers also include, in a
democracy, the citizens who elect and influence lawmakers, who confer
legitimacy upon legal institutions, who support or acquiesce in their
enforcement efforts, and who ultimately must decide whether to obey the law,
and how.'7 So to say that "law" is an expressive or aesthetic activity is to say
that the decisions we face in collective self-governance are partly, but
unavoidably, expressive or aesthetic.
By "expressive" and "aesthetic" I refer to two noninstrumental motives for
human action, commonly thought to motivate artistic creation. Expressive
actions are undertaken to identify the actor with a certain value, or character, or
identity." The term "aesthetic" refers to value that is final rather than
14. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note I, at 22-27.
15. Id. at 26-27.
16. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 47-70 (1986) (arguing that practices of
constructive interpretation, like legal argument and literary criticism, involve developing and
invoking theories of the purpose underlying the particular practice).
17. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1617-18 (1986)
(arguing that law's coercive force depends on the acquiescence and active cooperation of
large numbers of those subject to it).
18. In Croce's influential aesthetic theory, "expression" has the broader meaning of
any cognition or articulation of concrete, particular, or aesthetic intuitions. See generally,
BENEDETTO CROCE, THE AESTHETIC AS THE SCIENCE OF ExPRESSION AND THE LINGUISTIC IN
GENERAL (Colin Lyas trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1902). 1 am using the term in
[Vol. 53:15091512
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instrumental, but that nevertheless depends upon subjective judgment.
Aesthetic judgment is concrete and particular: It can be governed by no
general standard of value given in advance. In this sense, aesthetic judgment is
free. When we value aesthetically we value what we are not ethically bound or
logically compelled to value. Yet aesthetic value is not the same as pleasure.
It is conferred by an act of judgment, so that we can appreciate what we do not
enjoy, and enjoy what we do not appreciate. 9 Aesthetic judgment does not
apply standards of value, but instead assesses values. Aesthetic criticism
identifies values expressed by human creations, judges those values, and also
judges the creations as better or worse expressions of those values.
20
In defining aesthetic value in this way, I mean to leave open the
the narrower but less technical sense of "self-expression," that is, the articulation or
representation of an individual, group, or institutional character in a concrete medium.
19. This conception of the aesthetic as a noncategorical judgment premised on a
disinterested satisfaction is attributable primarily to Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE
CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT §§ 5, 9, 10, 33 (James Creed Meredith trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1986) (1790) (arguing that aesthetic judgment establishes a relation between a representation
and a disinterested satisfaction, rather than a concept or category; reasons may give rise to
this disinterested satisfaction, but cannot substitute for it; objects of aesthetic judgment are
viewed as ends in themselves, without instrumental purpose). A similar conception of
aesthetic judgment is found earlier, however, in the moral sense philosophers Shaftesbury
and Hutcheson, who analogized aesthetic and moral responses. See generally ANTHONY
ASHLEY COOPER, THIRD EARL OF SHAFTESBURY, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING VIRTUE, OR
MERIT (David Walford ed., 1977) (1699) (claiming that aesthetic and moral judgment both
result from sensation and are unmediated by standards; aesthetic judgment is disinterested);
FRANCIS HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY AND VIRTUE
(1725) (describing the sense of beauty as unreflective and not mediated by concepts or
instrumental goals). The notion that aesthetic judgment plays a role in legitimating the
institutional constraints of social order is a theme in the Kant-influenced aesthetic theories of
Schiller and Schelling. See F.W.J. SCHELLING, SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM
(Peter Heath trans., 1978) (1800) (arguing that artistic creation models the integration of
freedom and constraint realized by the good society); FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, ON THE
AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN: IN A SERIES OF LETERS (Reginald Snell trans., 1954) (1795)
(arguing that the capacity for aesthetic appreciation and imagination enables humans to form
institutions by submitting to rules, and to form social relationships by accommodating
others).
20. Ronald Dworkin's "Aesthetic Hypothesis" about literary interpretation is that it
aims at a reading of the literary text which makes it the best possible work of literature.
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 149 (1985). "[A]nyone who interprets a work
of art relies on beliefs of a theoretical character about ... formal properties of art, as well as
on more explicitly normative beliefs about what is good in art." Id. at 152. Dworkin applies
this "aesthetic hypothesis" to legal judgment, concluding that "[a] plausible interpretation of
legal practice must also, in a parallel way, satisfy a test of two dimensions: it must both fit
that practice and show its point or value." Id. at 160. This analogy treats legal judgment and
literary criticism as similar practices of what Dworkin calls "constructive interpretation."
DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 50-53, 87-90. Dworkin's formulation implies that a work of
literature might imperfectly embody an idea or value, whereas Croce's system implies that
an imperfectly expressed aesthetic idea was imperfectly intuited and hence was a confused
idea. See CROCE, supra note 18.
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relationship between aesthetics and ethics. If ethical value means simply
"value," it of course includes aesthetic value. But ethics can refer to evaluative
judgments made by subsuming a particular under some category or concept, in
which case it is distinct from aesthetic value. It can refer more narrowly to the
duties governing human action, or more narrowly still, to the duties that flow
from an attitude of impartiality, or equal concern for the welfare or dignity of
all persons. To the extent that ethical judgment involves applying a universal
standard of value, formulated in advance of the act of judgment, it is different
from aesthetic judgment.
Accordingly, I do wish to distinguish aesthetic value from one conception
of ethical value prevalent among moral philosophers and legal theorists.
According to this conception, an ethical theory must be built on the foundation
of some universally applicable conception of the good. Such an ethical theory
applies this universal standard to all human actions, including those actions that
enact and apply law (and presumably those that produce art and literature as
well). According to this foundationalist conception of value, a legal theory is
just a special application of an ethical theory, which in turn is just an
application of an overall conception of the good. This foundationalist model of
value leads to fallacious criticisms of legal institutions and legal theories, based
on the ethical values they supposedly entail.
By contrast, a pragmatic approach to value presumes that justifying a
practice does not require a general theory of value-it requires only comparing
that practice to feasible alternatives. Value, in this sense, is local. A utilitarian
approach to punishment, for example, need not entail a utilitarian ethic. 2' Thus,
from a pragmatic standpoint, justifying legal institutions does not necessarily
require evaluating them ethically. But pragmatism does not authorize us to
perpetuate legal institutions without evaluating them at all. Nor may we
evaluate legal institutions in a purely instrumental way, without assessing our
ends. Thus, the pragmatic evaluation of law will involve judgment that is
neither foundationalist nor instrumental. Such judgment is aesthetic, in the
sense indicated. To say that legal decisions are inevitably aesthetic and
expressive is to say that we cannot simply fashion our law to serve our
purposes without also judging those purposes worthy and claiming them as our
own.2
2
In reviewing Literary Criticisms of Law, Judge Posner poses the question,
"What has literary theory to offer law?" This is a variant of his standard
21. See Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment
of the Innocent, 32 RLJTrERs L.J. 115 (2001).
22. See DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 50-53, 69, 73, 87-90, 93 (developing the aesthetic
hypothesis that, in constructive interpretation, purposes ascribed to enterprise must be
judged worthy and must fit interpretive data); id. at 78-83, 189-90 (claiming that judgments
of legal validity are internal to a legal system).
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jurisprudential interrogatory: He has elsewhere asked, "What has moral
philosophy to offer law?"' 3 After posing his favorite question about the law
and literature movement, Judge Posner also gives his favorite answer:
"Nothing. '24 In asking and answering this question he apparently restricts
literary theory to ideas about the form and aesthetic value of imaginative
literary works, and thereby excludes any implications for law and politics.
Judge Posner's notion of literary theory appears to exclude even the writings of
literary critics like Jacques Derrida and Stanley Fish about language, politics
and culture.2- Likewise, he seems to use the term "law" quite narrowly to refer
only to the application of law by judges and lawyers, but not to lawmaking.
26
Judge Posner insists on reading our book as an attempt to determine the utility
of literary theory, narrowly defined, in practicing law. This, he says, in
opening his review, "is the question that the authors of Literary Criticisms of
Law set out to answer in more than 500 pages of tightly packed print dense
with leaming.
'27
Needless to say, Judge Posner finds much in our long and wide-ranging
book that falls outside his procrustean concern with the utility of literary theory
for courts. First, Literary Criticisms of Law is not a defense of law-as-literature
scholarship but a critical and reformist work. Second, the book proposes a
broader kind of literary theory than Judge Posner contemplates, one that cannot
23. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 348.
24. See Posner, supra note 2, at 195.
25. See id. at 200 (claiming that Fish "writes as a philosopher in the debate over
interpretation"); id. at 205 (arguing that Derrida's critique of Rousseau's ideas about
political and linguistic representation has a merely "tenuous" connection "to either law or
literature"). While Posner chooses to define literary theory quite narrowly, so as to restrict
its relevance to law and politics, he defends the application of economics to nonmarket
behavior by saying:
"[E]conomics"... has neither a fixed intension nor a fixed extension.... Definitions of
economics are hopeless. One cannot say that economics is what economists do, because
many noneconomists do economics.... One cannot call economics the study of markets,
because other disciplines study markets ... and because it begs the question of the proper
domain of economics to define economics as the study of markets and refuse to defend the
definition.
POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 368.
26. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 6-9 (identifying "law" with courts
and jurisprudence with the search for constraints on judicial decision); POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that a major goal of his book on "legal theory"
is to influence judges to pay more attention to social science); Posner, supra note 2, at 196
("The first and more straightforward way [to treat law as a subject of literary criticism]
would be to analyze legal texts, such as statutes, wills, contracts, briefs, and judicial opinions
(the most obvious candidate, given the literary distinction of some of our famous judges) as
if they were literary texts."); id. at 198 (implying that the focus should be on "practical
benefits" to "the legal system"). But cf. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 3, at vii
("My conception of legal theory is broad, sweeping within it matters that might be thought to
belong to political or social theory ... .
27. Posner, supra note 2, at 195.
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be separated neatly from cultural history or political and social theory. Third,
our constructive argument for a more culturally and historically situated law-
as-literature scholarship rests not on its utility in applying law, but on the
necessity of expressive and aesthetic criteria in evaluating (and so in
reforming) law. All this is ancillary to the one question Judge Posner claims
we set out to answer.
Rather than forcing Judge Posner to revise his understanding of the book
and engage its argument, all this countervailing data merely annoys him and
provokes him to impatience. Thus, he complains that "[tihe authors are
fascinated by, and minutely examine, a set of scholarly literatures that have no
practical significance for law; some of them are not about law at all."28 True,
he concedes, "Literary Criticisms of Law is an interesting book,"29 but a
degenerate one. Indeed, he compares it to Oscar Wilde's The Picture of
Dorian Gray,0 and characterizes it as a work of "decadent" literature:
"intricate, subtle, ornate, self-indulgent, and disdainful of utility."'3' While the
book is full of "shrewd ' 32 and "penetrating criticisms," 33 and passages which
are "pungent," 34 and even "wonderful," 35 the properly self-disciplined reader
will resist these temptations to dally and reflect, and will hew to Posner's
criterion of "utility." In so doing she will read with economic efficiency,
attending only to her own purposes, learning only what she consents to leam.
Although tirelessly prolix himself,36 Posner confessed to finding our book
"fatiguingly long."37 It is no wonder he found it fatiguing to read so much with
such narrowly restricted attention. Readers must judge for themselves whether
it is indeed "efficient" to consume books in this bulimic fashion.
Judge Posner suspects he knows why our book and our subject are so
impractical. Modem literary theory, he feels, is the useless plaything of
enervated leftist intellectuals, combining unrealistic politics with unrigorous
method.3 Judge Posner suggests that literary theory has a natural appeal for
28. Id.
29. Id. at 196.
30. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTrURE OF DORIAN GRAY (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1908).
31. Posner, supra note 2, at 195.
32. Id. at 196.
33. Id. at 208.
34. Id. at 196.
35. Id. at 203.
36. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 3, is 597 pages, and RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998) is 802 pages.
37. Posner, supra note 2, at 195.
38. Modem literary theory involves a turning away from the classic works of literature to
texts and practices ... that provide easier vehicles for making political points, invariably of a
left-wing cast ... but decked out in a forbidding vocabulary drawn from a kaleidoscope of
overlapping theories.... These theories in their number and famously obscure jargon place
a barrier rather than a magnifying lens between the literary scholar and the work of literature.
They... [channel] left-wing intellectual energies into politically inert obscurantism and
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left-wing academics because of its impracticality-that they amuse themselves
with such irrelevancies because, in the wake of the Cold War, they no longer
have any credible practical program to offer. Judge Posner invokes Richard
Rorty, everyone's favorite pragmatist (mine too), who has criticized left-wing
literary theorists for giving up on democracy and withdrawing into useless
ideology critique.39 One might think that the remedy for this situation would be
for literary theorists to turn their attention to law and consider the normative
dilemmas confronting our democracy. This is what our book urges them to do.
But Judge Posner is convinced that there really are no such normative
dilemmas. There is very little that popular majorities can or should accomplish
by changing the law .4  As far as Judge Posner is concerned, the left's
redistributive aims are inherently impractical and can only be maintained
through a childish refusal to acknowledge economic reality.4' Thus, in a
market economy, redistribution of wealth will always be undone by
transactions that put wealth in the hands of the socially productive rather than
the needy.42 Hence, Judge Posner concludes, visions of social justice can only
be imposed by the economically suffocating and politically repressive process
of government planning.43 Since all important decisions must be left to market
transactions, there is very little that law can or should do, other than clarifying
and enforcing property and contract rights.44 Law should not embody any
scheme of values, but should simply provide a framework within which
individuals can pursue their own ends, thereby yielding an efficient allocation
of resources and maximizing wealth. From this perspective, democratic
decisionmakers have no real normative discretion, so there is no practical point
to normative legal theory of any kind.
Judge Posner tries to show that our book is really addressed only to left-
wing academics (he complains, for example, that it ignores the contributions to
faculty intrigue ....
Id. at 197.
39. See id. (quoting Richard Rorty, Intellectuals in Politics: Too Far In? Too Far
Out?, DIssENT, Fall 1991, at 483, 489-90 and Richard Rorty, The End of Leninism and
History as Comic Frame, in HISTORY AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 211, 223 (Arthur M.
Melzer, Jerry Weinberger & M. Richard Zinman eds., 1995)).
40. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 3, at 25-26 (asserting that democratic
majorities and democratically controlled legislatures are prone to support wasteful, "inane"
legislation).
41. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 384-86 (accusing Rorty of romantic
naivet6 for entertaining Roberto Unger's socialist proposals).
42. See id. at 337-38 (criticizing Bruce Ackerman's arguments for redistribution of
wealth); id. at 359 (arguing that judges can do little to redistribute wealth); id. at 375
(arguing that initial distributions would be quickly undone by market exchanges); id. at 383-
84 (calling Brian Barry's redistributive proposals "a prescription for economic disaster").
43. See id. at 386.
44. Id. at 359-60.
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law and literature of Frank Easterbrook!). 45 What Judge Posner seems to mean
is that our criticisms of the predominantly left-liberal law and literature
movement are respectful and reformist rather than dismissive. Rather than just
showing off our caustic wit, we endeavor to explicate the work with which we
disagree and make the strongest case we can for it (we have avoided directing
the reader's attention to work for which little can be said). We then try to
frame our criticisms in ways that we hope could convince even the authors
themselves. In some cases this means pointing out inconsistencies between the
author's normative aims and her methodological means. Where we find an
author's methods well-serving values we find objectionable, our approach is
usually to explicate those values as clearly as we can and leave them for the
reader to judge. Judge Posner finds this careful critical method tedious, which
is a fair criticism--careful thought about questions of value is indeed
"fatiguingly" 46 hard work for authors and readers alike. But perversely, Judge
Posner also finds this critical method "self-indulgent" rather than self-
disciplined. He would prefer that we spare readers this work and just sling
some epithets.
This is what Judge Posner himself does when he dismisses literary
theorists as "laughingstocks." 47 His recent The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory48 employs this same bullying style of argument against another
branch of the humanities, moral philosophy. Problematics argues that
academic moral philosophy has not contributed useful arguments to policy
debate.49 I am in sympathy with this position, since I do not think pragmatic
policy arguments need be premised on systematic moral philosophies. And as
Judge Posner correctly points out, too often philosophers try to answer
consequentialist policy arguments by criticizing the supposed (but often
nonexistent) ethical premises of those arguments.5 0 But not content to outsell
the interdisciplinary competititon, Judge Posner wants to put them out of
business as well. He is too pragmatic to waste his valuable time trying to
change the minds of philosophers. He does not urge them to become more
interested in political and legal theory, and less interested in ethics; or to
become more interested in the virtues and vices of institutions and less
interested in the virtues and vices of individuals. He does not urge them to
become more careful, perceptive and sympathetic readers, who interpret policy
arguments as expressions of situated projects rather than of disembodied
principles. Instead, he argues that moral philosophy is a waste of social
45. Posner, supra note 2, at 198.
46. Id. at 195.
47. Id. at 197-98.
48. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 4.
49. Id. at 17 (concluding that "academic moralism is a useless endeavor").
50. See id. at 15-16, 51-53, 89-90, 111-12, 124.
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resources,5' which would die a useful death if forced to make its way in the
market.52 He portrays its exponents as social parasites, 3 inexorably drawn by
the gravitational pull of their downward sloping demand curves, to a soft life of
unproductive speculation. 4
This social Darwinist approach to intellectual debate reduces opponents to
the status of social costs rather than addressing them as fellow scholars or
citizens. It cheapens its author's ethos even as it demeans his targets. It
thereby undercuts his otherwise persuasive defense of pragmatic policy
analysis and suggests that pragmatism is underwritten by repugnant ethical
attitudes after all. In light of his decision to exclude the humanities scholars he
attacks from his audience, Judge Posner's complaint that Literary Criticisms of
Law addresses only leftist intellectuals is an ironic rhetorical flourish.
Although portraying himself as democratically inclusive, Judge Posner is really
complaining that we addressed such people at all. Judge Posner's ironic
accusation of exclusiveness recalls his perverse characterization of careful
reading and respectful criticism as self-indulgence. Both charges bring to mind
his own witticism that "people tend to be highly sensitive to their own
weaknesses when they see them in other people."55
Judge Posner's charge that Literary Criticisms of Law addresses only
leftists is not just ironic, but also false. He correctly points out that we think
literary theory is "a potentially rich resource for leftist critique,"56 but
suppresses the fact that we think it may also be a rich source of conservative
critique. We advocate a Nietzschean cultural criticism of law, corrosive to the
individualist premises of liberalism and critical of liberalism's aspirations to
value neutrality. Such a criticism could promote radical57 or conservative 8
51. See id. at 17.
52. See id. at 88 (characterizing moral philosophy as a "weak academic field" that is
able to persist because universities are non-profit institutions, because of tenure, and because
of information barriers); id. at 285 (claiming that because the humanities are a "natural target
for cost-cutting administrators" humanists are being driven into law, which is a development
"not entirely to be welcomed").
53. See id. at 80 ("Academic moral philosophy ... has no customers ... and makes no
falsifiable claims .... mhe academic moralist has no incentive to be useful to anybody ....
[Moral philosophers] need not, and... usually do not, generate a positive social product.").
54. See id. ("[hey take few professional risks, and never any personal risks. They
live a comfortable bourgeois life, with maybe a touch of the bohemian. They either think
Left and live Right, or think Right and live Right"); id. at 69 (asserting the reluctance of
moral philosophers to teach students).
55. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 4, at 276.
56. Posner supra note 2, at 195.
57. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS
FOR A NEw AGE (1984); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980);
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); William E. Forbath,
Class, Caste and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1999); William H. Simon, Social-
Republican Properly, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1335 (1991).
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alternatives to liberalism, or it could resurrect liberal institutions on a
foundation of virtues and values rather than rights and preferences.59 What it
cannot do is pretend that liberal institutions are simply instruments of
individual preferences. That kind of liberal individualism cannot withstand the
challenges of Nietzschean perspectivism, Aristotelian perfectionism, or even
Rortyan pragmatism. If science cannot simply be nature's mirror,60 neither can
law serve as society's mirror. 6' Just as we now think of science as an
institutionally situated practice of organizing nature for human purposes, law is
an institutionally situated practice of organizing society for human purposes.
In neither case are the governing purposes simply given in advance: they are
identified within the practice. Law does not simply reflect society's
preferences, it represents them.
That literary critics of law have mostly been left-wing does not authorize
right-wing scholars to ignore their arguments. Nor does the fact that value
questions are hard absolve the ordinary citizens of a democracy from the
tedious obligation to think about them. Judge Posner's standard critical
question (What does normative legal theory offer?) and his answer (Too much
work!) essentially reduces democratic deliberation to the plane of consumer
choice. And when he frames the question as what does normative legal theory
offer courts, he denies that the choice is one for democratic majorities to make.
While Judge Posner's attack on leftist humanities scholars is intemperate,
his suspicion that much contemporary literary theory serves as an obscurantist
substitute for a political program is well founded. As our book shows,
especially in Chapters One, Two, and Five, much literary criticism of law,
although advertised as politically progressive, amounts to normatively empty
skepticism. But not all literary theory is normatively empty, and not all literary
theory is left-wing. Our fourth chapter, "Rhetorical Criticism of Law,"
considers the legal applications of a tradition of literary theory, classical in
origin and conservative in normative implications. Unfortunately, Judge
58. See HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
ISSUES IN THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES (Univ. of Chi. Press 1982) (1959); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984); MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); LEO STRAUSS, THE CITY AND MAN
(1964); LEO STRAUSS, ON TYRANNY (1963).
59. See, e.g., DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989);
STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
(1995); RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TwENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1998); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY
(1989); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997); MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
60. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 131-39 (1979)
(criticizing the philosophical project of trying to show some connection between the world
and our representations of it).
61. Fish, supra note 5, at 57-60 (arguing that attempts to free legal doctrine and
terminology of values and concepts are futile).
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Posner's assumptions about what left-leaning literary theorists of law like us
must be saying prevents him from grasping the critique of left-wing skepticism
we offer in Chapters One, Two, and Five. Judge Posner's procrustean
assumptions also prevent him from seeing the serious challenge to his own
value-neutrality posed by the right-wing literary theories discussed in Chapter
Four.
Literary Criticisms of Law explores five different genres of law-as-
literature scholarship: hermeneutic, narrative, rhetorical, deconstructive, and
cultural criticism of law. Each is distinguished by a different version of the
law-as-literature metaphor and a different set of theoretical sources, problems,
and purposes. Chapters One and Two develop a critique of the most prevalent
application of literary theory to law, the hermeneutic criticism of law. This
genre treats interpretation as the paradigmatic activity of lawyers and
analogizes legal interpretation to free-wheeling literary criticism in asserting,
attacking, or defending its subjectivity. Skeptical critics use this analogy in
attacking adjudication as illegitimate because not constrained by the
objectively discernible meaning of legal texts. Sentimental and authoritarian
defenders of adjudication respond with a flattering portrayal of the activist
judge as a kind of literary artist, whose otherwise illegitimate exercise of
subjective judgment is justified only by artistic genius, virtuous character, or
refined taste. Both skeptical critics and sentimental or authoritarian defenders
of legal interpretation accept the same unpragmatic premise: that legal
interpretation cannot be legitimate unless it rests upon a foundation of objective
knowledge about meaning. Proceeding from this faulty premise, hermeneutic
criticism presumes that lawyers always claimed that legal texts had determinate
meaning until modem literary theory discredited that claim.
Chapter One, "Interpretive Crises in American Legal Thought,"62 debunks
this presumptive history and shows that American lawyers have not had to
learn about interpretive discretion from literary theorists. It provides a history
of American legal thought on interpretation showing that generations of
American lawyers saw legal interpretation as an institutionally situated practice
of using texts, rather than as a hunt for a determinate preexisting meaning. It
also shows that American lawyers and legal theorists have experienced little
anxiety about the legitimacy of interpretation except in rare situations of
institutional and cultural crisis. It argued that the civil rights movement
provoked such a crisis in constitutional interpretation because it forced liberal
lawyers and judges-who increasingly had come to see themselves as
interpreters and agents of public will-to apply the Constitution in defiance of
cultural norms and prevailing opinions. This placed the judge in the unlikely
role of cultural iconoclast and inspired legal theorists to reconceive the
62. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 28-111.
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constitutional interpreter as a kind of avant garde artist.
Chapter Two, "Hermeneutic Criticism of Law,"63 traces developments in
literary theory that provided legal scholars with a new conception of the literary
reader and critic as a creative artist, who was as responsible for the aesthetic
experience of the literary work as its author. And Chapter Two shows how
legal scholars took up this idea of the reader as creative artist and used it to
make sense of the crisis in constitutional interpretation. Constitutional law was
in crisis, legal scholars thought, because language was intractably alien, its true
meaning unknowable. Chapter Two argues, however, that this view of
language misconstrues literary theory, and ignores the wisdom of traditional
legal theories of interpretation. Chapter Two shows that the most cogent
accounts of literary meaning share with the best accounts of legal meaning a
pragmatic understanding of reading and writing as institutionally situated
practices of deploying conventions. Indeed, it argues that literary theories of
interpretation would be improved by paying more attention to legal
interpretation. A pragmatic approach to legal interpretation precludes both the
giddy skepticism that has agitated interpretation's detractors and the genteel
authoritarianism that has beguiled interpretation's defenders. Such a pragmatic
approach acknowledges that crises in constitutional interpretation derive from
the contradictions of American political culture, not the inscrutability of
language.
Given his professed pragmatism, Judge Posner should be attracted to this
argument. But he seems to have thoroughly and insistently misunderstood it.
He misidentifies legal interpretation as a sixth genre of literary criticism of
law,64 and he therefore reads Chapter One as a "lame" attempt to show that
theorists of legal interpretation have always been influenced by literary
theory.65 To the contrary, Chapter One demonstrates that American lawyers
have no need of literary theories of interpretation because they have their own
philosophically sophisticated accounts of interpretation. What seems to have
confused Judge Posner is that, in the interest of full disclosure, we presented
whatever evidence we found of literary influence on American legal thought
before the 1970s. Our story would be simpler without this evidence, but less
true.
In reading Chapter Two, Judge Posner seems unable to distinguish
explication of works from endorsement of them. Thus, Judge Posner
understandably ridicules the idea that judges should be conceived as avant
garde artists and protests that the analogy is so imprecise as to reduce art and
literature to mere "honorifics."' '  But instead of crediting us with these
63. See id. at 112-200.
64. Posner, supra note 2, at 198.
65. See id. at 199.
66. Id.
[Vol. 53:15091522
THE POETICS OF THE PRAGMATIC
objections to hermeneutic criticism of law, he identifies us with the works we
criticize. Apparently, Judge Posner is an ardent believer in the adage that to
understand is to forgive, because he assumes we would not bother explicating
these works carefully unless we agreed with them. And true to this principle,
he has resisted understanding a chapter he did not expect to agree with.
Chapter Five, "Deconstructive Criticism of Law,' 67 explains Jacques
Derrida's "deconstruction" as a combination of three logically independent
elements: (1) a sensibly pragmatic epistemology of reading, (2) a
manipulative, intellectually dishonest technique for reading essentialist
metaphysical commitments into any text, and (3) an elitist hostility to popular
mobilization and participatory democracy. 6s Derrida's critique of Rousseauean
democracy implies a preference for the rule of law, which involves exhausting
popular will in representative institutions and professionally interpreted legal
texts. Although Judge Posner finds this analysis "very interesting," he insists
that Derrida's famous critique of Rousseau in Of Grammatology69 has naught to
do with literary or legal theory.70 Yet a conception of modem literary theory
that excludes the central argument of Derrida's most influential book is, to say
the least, eccentric. Judge Posner is simply reasserting the dogmatic position
he took in Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, that literature can
have nothing to do with politics or law.71 Similarly, a conception of legal
theory that excludes Rousseau's views on the sovereign basis of legitimate law
is impoverished and-in a world where most legal systems trace their
intellectual origins to the French Revolution-parochial. Here, Judge Posner
reveals his premise that law is properly conceived as a framework of rules for
the pursuit of private interest, rather than as an instrument of popular will.
Chapter Five proceeds to criticize the skeptical application of
deconstruction by critical legal scholars ("crits") who claim legal doctrine is
indeterminate. 72  Judge Posner misreads our argument as a claim that
67. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 378-461.
68. See id. at 380-408.
69. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak trans., Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (1967).
70. Posner, supra note 2, at 205.
71. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 3, at 13-17.
Some practitioners [of law and literature] have exaggerated the commonalities between the
two fields .... In their hands literary theory, or particular works of literature, are contorted
to make literature seem relevant to law, and law is contorted to make it seem continuous with
literature.... Mhe legal matter in most literature on legal themes is peripheral to the
meaning and significance of the literature.... [By its very nature, literature-especially
great literature-deals with the permanent and general aspects of human nature and
institutions.... [L]aw as depicted in literature is often just a metaphor for something else
.... [L]iterature tends to deal with basic, timeless features of human existence.... [Tihe
problems of literary and of legal interpretation have little in common except the word
"interpretation."
72. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note I, at 40840.
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deconstruction does not approve of skepticism. 73 Of course it does: Derrida
cynically deploys skeptical arguments all the time. But Derrida's pragmatic
epistemological premises expose the poverty of such skepticism, and his
antidemocratic conclusions show that skeptical argument does not necessarily
serve the crits' political aims. Indeed, such skepticism does not well serve any
political ends, because it is (1) politically empty, and (2) fallacious. We
conclude that skepticism has distracted the crits from the social and cultural
context that would help them discern the political meaning of legal doctrine.
Such an understanding of law's underlying political values is requisite to any
political critique of law, whether from the left or the right. In Literary
Criticisms of Law, the goal of meaningful political debate about the values
expressed and fostered by law takes precedence over the particular outcomes
such debate might yield.
Chapter Four, "Rhetorical Criticism of Law," 74 acknowledges that not all
literary criticism of law is from the left. Chapter Four shows that the
conservative rhetorician Leo Strauss and his followers thought the Nietzschean
and Heideggerian challenge to liberal individualism was unanswerable.75 We
show that Strauss responded with his own authoritarian conservative challenge
to liberal individualism, and argue that liberal rhetoricians like James Boyd
White lack a convincing response to this kind of conservatism (and also partake
of it). Judge Posner likes the discussion of Strauss very much, 76 in part, I think,
because it presents Strauss' professedly "esoteric" rhetoric as an obscurantist
response to the political unpopularity of Strauss's conservative ideas. Yet,
once again, Judge Posner cannot figure out what it's doing in the book.77 He
seems puzzled to find the author of Natural Right and History 8 and
Persecution and the Art of Writing79 in a book on law as literature. Strauss, like
Nietzsche and Heidegger, was a cultural critic of modem society, who drew an
illiberal value theory from the creative and idiosyncratic interpretation of
classical texts. Strauss' philosophy was centrally about the bases of legal
authority and legitimacy. Judge Posner complains that we do not tell him
whether there are any Straussian law professors or judges.8 In fact, we show
that Alexander Bickel, the most influential constitutional theorist of the
twentieth century, drew some of his prudential conservatism from the
Straussian well, by way of Harry Jaffa's Straussian reading of Lincoln's
73. Posner, supra note 2, at 205.
74. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 292-377.
75. Id. at 319.
76. Posner, supra note 2, at 203.
77. Id.
78. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953).
79. LEO STRAUSS, PERSECUTION AND THE ART OF WRITING (1952).
80. Posner, supra note 2, at 203.
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rhetoric and political philosophy.8' We also discuss the Straussian law
professor George Anastaplo, who has just published his own book on Lincoln. 82
Straussianism is not our only example of conservative rhetorical theory.
We also explicate the conservative school of Aristotelian rhetorical criticism
that developed at Chicago, and show its influence, via Wayne Booth, on
White. 3 Judge Posner likes our criticisms of White, his old antagonist, and
approves a passage in which we charge that White wants a politics that
preserves the classical forms of debate about principle, while precluding
commitment to any principle. 4 But Judge Posner does not appreciate that this
criticism is premised on the previous discussions developing the Straussian
interpretation of the classical worldview as a form of orthodoxy. For Strauss,
and for some of the Aristotelian critics, it is the truth of that worldview which
authorizes the wise to manipulate and deceive the simple by means of esoteric
rhetoric. White seems to want the authoritarian practice of classical rhetoric,
without the orthodoxy of principle which underwrote it, and so he gathers the
classical worldview in a half-hearted, surreptitious embrace. The critique of
White depends on the contrasting discussion of Strauss. Judge Posner seems
convinced by both, but misses the connection between them.
Having thoroughly missed the point of Chapter Four, Judge Posner
complains that it doesn't tell him how to use rhetoric more effectively in
writing opinions, so as to fulfill his Bickelian role as a prudential judicial
artist.8 -5 Once again, he mistakes a critical discussion-this time of Bickel-for
an endorsement. He doesn't see that the immediately following discussion of
Jaffa, Lincoln, and Strauss, which he dismisses as "veering off' into
"excursus," is a criticism of Bickel's prudential conservatism. He doesn't
grasp that Bickelian judicial rhetoric is a variant of Straussian "esoteric"
writing, allied to an authoritarian jurisprudence of principle. Finally, he
doesn't see that proponents of such a Bickelian rhetoric of principle face a
dilemma between Strauss' orthodoxy and White's tepid civility. So if Judge
Posner were reading more attentively, albeit less efficiently, he might be less
eager to practice Bickelian judicial rhetoric.
In the Problems of Jurisprudence, Judge Posner identifies his own
pragmatism with conservative prudentialism,8 6 praising the legal traditionalism
of Blackstone s7 and of Edmund Burke,88 who is admired by both Bickel89 and
81. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 309-21.
82. See id. at 322-23; GEORGE ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A CONSTITUTIONAL
BIOGRAPHY (1999).
83. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 323-29, 333-37, 339-45.
84. Posner, supra note 2, at 204.
85. Id.
86. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 442-45.




White.9 Judge Posner sees such traditionalism as a useful corrective to the
tendency of Benthamite utilitarianism to promote ambitious social
engineering.9' And what's wrong with social engineering? As an enthusiast of
microeconomics, Judge Posner rejects the interpersonal comparison of utilities
that suggests to utilitarians that social welfare increases when wealth is
transferred from rich to poor.92 So the point of legal prudentialism in Judge
Posner's scheme is just to contract the scope of democratic decisionmaking so
as to expand the scope for transactional decisionmaking.
But for Burke, Strauss, and Bickel, the point of limiting public will is not
to free private will, but to subject both to authoritative values. The prudential
element in such conservatism consists in recognizing the need to flatter the
public into accepting the rule of the wise by presenting it as some kind of self-
rule. This program of popular manipulation is what necessitates rhetoric, the
rhetoric Bentham sought to banish from law. 93 Thus prudentialism seems to
preclude the value neutrality that economists like to claim, and to demand the
obscurantism that Judge Posner likes to decry. Judge Posner's embrace of
prudentialism suggests that his so-called "pragmatism" is not merely the clear-
eyed consequentialism it professes to be. His interest in judicial rhetoric 94 and
his admiration for Blackstone's obscurantism and Burke's romantic
traditionalism alert us that his evaluative vocabulary of "efficiency,"
"rationality," "practicality," and "utility" and his matter-of-fact "economical"
writing style constitute a rhetoric.9 They persuade us of the efficacy of
markets by establishing a certain character, the embodiment of bourgeois
virtue, begging us to loose the fetters of regulation so that he can get busy for
our benefit, banishing waste and fighting indolence.96
88. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790).
89. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 11-25 (1975).
90. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 192-230 (1984).
91. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 444.
92. See id. at 346.
93. See JEREMY BENTHAM, I THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 260-95 (John Bowring
ed., 1962) (attacking the "Mystifying Terminology" of Blackstone's discussion of the British
Constitution).
94. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION at xi (1990)
("Prominent judges like Cardozo are figures in the history and the practice of rhetoric and
philosophy as well as of law."); POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 3, at 269-316
(1988) (evaluating judicial opinions as literature); POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 3,
at 498-530 (considering legal reasoning as rhetoric).
95. On economics as rhetoric, see DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF
ECONOMICS (1985); James B. White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54
TENN. L. REV. 161 (1987).
96. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 391 ("Wealth maximization is an
ethic of productivity and social cooperation-to have a claim on society's goods and
services you must be able to offer something that other people value .... ).
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Judge Posner's characterization of our book as a decadent work of
literature, to be judged aesthetically and convicted of self-indulgence, is an
example of this rhetoric of self-congratulation. It is also a revealing variation
on the law-as-literature trope. Judge Posner's implied opposition between
decadent, self-indulgent literature and utilitarian, pragmatic, disciplined law is
as reductive and myopic as any of the false dichotomies that plague the law and
literature field. Like the familiar dichotomies between law as letter and
literature as spirit, law as reason and literature as emotion, or law as objective
and literature as subjective, Judge Posner's dichotomy between law as
instrumental and literature as ornamental, denies that literature inheres in law.
This antinomy enables Judge Posner, with one turn of phrase, to segregate
our cultural criticism of law from his own "efficiency" analysis of law. By
labeling our interest in law's cultural meaning and aesthetic -value wholly
impractical, he insulates not only law in general, but also his own purportedly
"pragmatic" legal theory, from cultural criticism and aesthetic evaluation. In
presuming that a concern for aesthetic value entails a disdain for utility, he
implies that his own appeals to such standards of value as utility, efficiency,
and practicality are free of aesthetic judgment.
Yet, despite appearances, Judge Posner's "pragmatic" ethic of efficiency
depends for its persuasiveness on an appeal to aesthetic value. To be sure,
standards like efficiency, utility and practicality sound entirely instrumental. In
promoting these values law presumably serves the preexisting preferences or
interests of some group of people, whatever those preferences or interests
might be. On such a theory, legally defined institutions like markets (or
legislatures or courts or administrative agencies) have a merely technical or
mimetic function. They are mere instruments of legal actors, reflecting and
effectuating their desires. They neither embody nor express values of their
own. By implementing people's desires, legal institutions will make people
happy, or maximize their "utility." By facilitating market transactions, law will
allocate goods "efficiently" to those who most value them. By accepting and
reflecting rather than resisting preferences, legal decisionmakers show a
''pragmatic" acceptance of economic "reality."
But this vision of law as a mere instrument of people's desires rests on
psychological assumptions that modem economists reject as unscientific. It
assumes that the choices offered by legal institutions can reflect people's "real"
desires. For example, the claim that markets maximize welfare assumes that the
amounts different people are willing and able to pay for a good reflect how
much they value it.97 Similarly the claim that majoritarian democracy enhances
welfare presumes that voters actually share the views of the candidates they
97. For a useful critique of Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as measures of welfare,
see Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy
Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501,516-21 (1997).
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vote for. The political economists of the nineteenth century, working in the
utilitarian tradition, thought it was possible to learn and sum people's true
desires. Some thought it was possible to design policies and institutions that
could be shown to maximize the satisfaction of desire.9 8 But the neoclassical
economists of today are behaviorists, skeptical about the possibility of knowing
other minds or comparing interpersonal utility. They reason that knowledge of
subjective desires is unobtainable and unnecessary for the purely scientific
project of modeling and predicting the movement of prices. They reject the
psychological language of utility, happiness, or desire in favor of the
behavioral language of "revealed preferences." 99  In so doing, they must
abandon the normative claim that voluntary exchange enhances welfare'o-
indeed, they must abandon the very idea of voluntariness as incoherent.'0' Law
98. See S.A. DRAKOPOULOS, VALUES AND ECONOMIC THEORY 27-32 (1991)
(discussing Bentham's theory of legislation based on measuring and aggregating pleasure);
id. at 35-36 (discussing Nassau Senior's economics based on measuring pleasure); id. at 40
(noting that John Stuart Mill saw utility as measurable and subject to interpersonal
comparisons); id. at 55-58 (discussing how W.S. Jevons saw utility as measurable in
principle, if not yet in practice); id. at 67-69 (explaining that Leon Walras founded his
marginalist economics on the notion that the satisfaction an individual derives from the
marginal unit of a good consumed is measurable, as is the aggregate satisfaction achieved in
a market); id. at 78-79 (noting that C. Menger's marginalist economics were premised on
measurable satisfaction of desire); id. at 88-93 (noting that F. Y. Edgeworth based his
economics on utility, saw utility as measurable and interpersonally comparable, was an
enthusiastic utilitarian in ethics, and supported progressive taxation based on the declining
marginal utility of money and the interpersonal comparability of utility).
99. The rejection of psychological hedonism in economics can be ascribed to the
influence of logical positivism, and reflects an effort to render economics a value-free
descriptive science modeled on physics. See id. at 99-100, 131-34. But it was also
influenced by behaviorist psychology. Id. at 135. The first major step in this direction was
the redefinition of utility as ordinal rather than cardinal (and hence as intrinsically
incomparable across persons) by, among others, Vilfredo Pareto. Id. at 106-16. The next
was the reconceptualization of economics as a science of choice or preference rather than
welfare by Lionel Robbins. See LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND
SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (1932); Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of
Utility: A Comment, 48 EcON. J. 635 (1938); see also J.R. Hicks & R.G.D. Allen, A
Reconsideration of the Theory of Value, 1 ECONOMICA 52 (1934) (discarding "utility" in
favor of the language of "preferences"). Finally, Paul Samuelson replaced "preference" with
the fully behavioristic notion of "revealed preference." Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on the
Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA 61 (1938); Paul A. Samuelson, The
Problem of Integrability in Utility Theory, 17 ECONOMICA 355 (1950). A famous defense of
behaviorist method in economics is MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive
Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953).
100. Posner agrees. See POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 4, at 46 ("What
economists can say... is that if a society values prosperity ... , here are policies that will
conduce the goal .... They cannot take the final step and say that society ought to aim at
growth ... or anything else.").
101. Posner seems not to see this. Compare the following two statements: "The
concern of economics is not with states of mind, but with what people-even animals, who
have no minds--do." POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 3, at 188 (citation omitted).
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cannot simply enable or enforce consent, but must define it.
In place of satisfaction or voluntary consent, modem economists substitute
the purely formal notion of "rationality," denoting consistency of behavior over
time rather than consistency of behavior with desire. The difficulty is that
economists can rarely observe such "rational" behavior patterns because
choosers are rarely confronted with precisely the same set of options twice.
Economic actors may persist in inefficacious behavior as a result of cognitive
dissonance reduction or addiction or social expectations, so that consistency of
behavior may mask changing or conflicted preferences. Nor does the rise and
fall of prices in response to changes in supply and demand indicate that market
actors are rationally maximizing the satisfaction of persistent tastes. 02 Some
economists think terms like rationality and utility maximization are simply
inapplicable to transactors with imperfect information about the intentions of
other transactors. 0 3  Yet if, as behaviorists, we can know nothing about
dispositions of others, then the information on which rationality depends is
simply unavailable.
As behaviorists, economists cannot presume that people hold preferences
that are both independent of law and knowable to law.10 But if we cannot
presume that the choices people make in institutions like markets express or
satisfy their desires, then we cannot treat these institutions as instruments of
their desires. This means that terms like "efficiency" and "utility" are not the
value-neutral, psychologically descriptive terms they appear to be. They do not
refer to actual desires or preferences or interests at all. Instead, they are vague
virtues that may be ascribed to different decision-making institutions like
markets, electoral politics, legislation, litigation, and administrative rule-
"The economic analysis of fraud and duress does not treat fraudulent or coerced choices as
consensual. Far from denying that fraud, duress, incapacity, and sometimes mistake should
be defenses to suits to enforce contracts, economic analysis demonstrates that such defenses
are necessary in order to make sure that inefficient transactions are not enforced." Id. at 191
(citations omitted).
102. Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. I
(1962) (arguing that even if people are not rational, one would expect a higher price to lead
to a reduction in the amount demanded); Ronald H. Coase, Coase on Posner on Coase, 149
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 96, 97 (1993) (discussing Becker's findings).
103. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law
and Economics, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 99, 109 (1993) (substituting
"bounded rationality" to describe transactors with imperfect information).
104. Endowment effects, wealth effects, and adaptive preference formation may all
condition preferences on the distribution of legal entitlements. See generally RICHARD H.
THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991) (exploring the implications of various
empirically observed departures from rationality); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory,
Production Theory and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979)
(same); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REV. 387, 422-29 (1981) (same); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private




making. These institutions do not reflect preferences or interests that pre-exist
the decision-making process. Instead they assign preferences and interests to
persons.
Like the economists he admires, Judge Posner is a behaviorist, skeptical of
our ability to know the pleasures and pains of others. He accordingly
disapproves of legal standards conditioning liability on subjective mental
states, and would substitute behavioral tests. 05 Consistent with these attitudes,
he eschews psychological standards of value like welfare or utility. He rejects
utilitarianism and praises allocative efficiency, not as welfare maximizing, but
merely as wealth maximizing.106 Yet it would be odd to value wealth
intrinsically, without regard to its utility to human welfare.' 7 So Judge
Posner's replacement of welfare with wealth-maximization raises the further
questions of why and how much to value wealth and how to compare it to other
values.0 8 Judge Posner's move to a "pragmatic" jurisprudence is compelled by
his unwillingness to rest his ethic of allocative efficiency on the psychological
foundations of welfarism.1 9 He thinks the allocative and distributive outcomes
of markets are desirable, but he wisely draws back from arguing that they are
what we all, in fact, desire.
Accordingly, when pressed to defend his commitment to efficient markets,
105. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 167-86.
106. Id. at 356, 381-82.
107. See generally Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191,
220 (1980) (arguing that it is "preposterous" to value social wealth intrinsically rather than
as a means to some other good); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 221-27 (rev. ed. 1990) ("[T]here is no argument
for Kaldor-Hicks from either utility or consent. There is an argument for Pareto superiority
from utility, but not from consent."). Nor is Posner himself consistent on this score. In
explaining why social wealth is enhanced when A purchases a stamp collection that he
values at $100 from B for $90, Posner says "the real addition to social wealth consists of the
$10 increment in nonpecuniary satisfaction that A derives from the purchase, compared with
that of B." POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 356. This is a utilitarian conception of
wealth. But how, as behaviorists, could we ever know the amount, if any, of A's consumer
surplus? As institutional economist Thrainn Eggertsson writes, "The concept of value,
defined as the maximum amount of one good that an individual is willing and able to give up
for another good, is a theoretical construct that is not observable." THRAINN EGGERTSSON,
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 24 (1990). And how is the assumption that we
could know the amount of such "value" consistent with Judge Posner's statement that "I may
desperately desire a BMW, but if I am... unable to pay its purchase price, society's wealth
would not be increased by transferring the BMW from its present owner to me"? POSNER,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 357. But see id. at 380 (implying that society is better off
after all if costly medicines go to those who need them rather than those who can pay for
them).
108. Id. at 375-80 (attempting to reconcile wealth maximization with competing
values).
109. Id. at 382-87 (stating that "the strongest argument for wealth maximization is not
moral, but pragmatic" and arguing that free market societies are more successful than
societies with planned economies).
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Judge Posner does so on the bases of their consequences, but his
consequentialism is pragmatic rather than utilitarian." '0 Thus, rather than
claiming that efficient markets make people happier, he paints alternative
pictures of the types of societies likely to result from market and nonmarket
methods of allocating resources. He reminds us that societies with planned
economies are often economically poor, politically repressive, culturally
dispirited, stagnant, and dull. Market societies, by contrast, are more dynamic,
optimistic, creative, wealthy, and politically responsive."' This amounts to an
argument that life in societies that depend relatively more on markets in
allocating resources is relatively more decent." 2 This sort of "pragmatic"
argument, asking us to compare alternative imagined societies without a metric,
is fundamentally aesthetic." 3
Thus, the dichotomy Judge Posner sets up between "decadent"
aestheticism and legal pragmatism is a false one. It seems designed to obscure
the aesthetic foundations of Judge Posner's legal economics and thereby to
insulate those aesthetic foundations from scrutiny. Judge Posner has been
defending himself against criticism from law and literature scholars for some
time. He has had to endure the accusation that his economic analysis was an
unprincipled, morally impoverished language of expediency from the likes of
Ronald Dworkin" 4 and James Boyd White. ' 5 But when he had to suffer Robin
West's sardonic charge that his economic explanations of human behavior and
his ethic of wealth maximization rested on an aesthetically impoverished
fiction, he felt compelled to respond.
110. Id. at 391 (arguing that wealth maximization is "different" than and superior to
utilitarianism in spirit).
11l. Id. at 382-84.
112. Id.at 387.
113. Posner offers a similarly aesthetic argument for what he calls the "vague
utilitarianism, or 'soft core' classical liberalism" of John Stuart Mill: "[l]t sketches a form of
life that when properly understood is attractive to many people in the United States and
similar wealthy modem societies, and not just to me." POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note
4, at xii-xiii (emphasis added). Posner uses similarly aesthetic terminology in describing
how other arguments succeed as pragmatic justifications. Of Judith Jarvis Thomson's
famous problem of being forced to provide life-support to a comatose violinist for nine
months, Posner writes: "What she is offering is not an argument but a metaphor designed to
change the way in which we think about abortion-to make us see it in a new light. This is a
valid technique of persuasion... but it owes nothing to what might be thought the discipline
of moral philosophy. She might as well have written a short story." Id. at 350 (emphasis
added). "The most important thing that law school imparts to its students.., is neither
method nor a doctrine, but.., a feel for the degree and character of doctrinal stability, or,
more generally, for the contours of a professional culture." Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
114. DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 107.
115. James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L.
REv. 162 n.1 (1987) (identifying Posner as the chief exponent of the conception of




West argued that the economic assumption that market choice always
reveals preference is an imaginative construct comparable to the motivational
structures that authors assign to fictional characters. In a droll essay comparing
Judge Posner's legal economics to Kafka's fiction, West presented both authors
as "tragic ironists" portraying the subjects of modem society in an incurable
state of isolation." 6 While Kafka's characters are isolated by alienation, social
anxiety, and paranoia, Judge Posner's characters are isolated by the
assumptions of microeconomics, each rationally pursuing interests knowable
only to themselves. According to West, Kafka's characters typically cajole
themselves into consenting to a host of humiliating situations out of self-
contempt, a need to please, or the urge to reduce cognitive dissonance. By
offering readers recognizably albeit neurotically self-destructive characters,
West cast doubt on the simplicity of the Posnerian picture of human
motivation. She also reminded readers that because economists treat subjective
experience as unknowable, their psychological assumptions are speculative
fictions, not empirical claims. Finally, having redefined Posner's vision of the
market as a literary artifact, she proceeded to criticize it from an aesthetic
standpoint. As we remarked in Literary Criticisms of Law, "[B]y contrast to
Kafka's fully integrated realization of tragic irony, Posner's narrative is... an
aesthetic pastiche, which first envisions tragic alienation and conflict and then
purports to resolve it all with glib happy-talk about rational consent and
allocative efficiency."" 7 West's article provoked a series of responses from
Judge Posner, culminating in his polemical attack on the law and literature
movement, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation."' In this book,
Judge Posner argued that imaginative literature had nothing to say about law,
and that the aesthetic values preoccupying literary criticism and theory have no
place in law." 9 Thus, Judge Posner was first drawn into the law and literature
field by his efforts to insulate his own legal economics from aesthetic criticism.
That Judge Posner's argument for markets relies on an aesthetic appeal is
no criticism, since this is true of all pragmatic argument. Such an appeal to
aesthetic judgment does not automatically render an argument unrigorous. But
Judge Posner's defense of markets is not very rigorous and this is partly
because it is so aesthetically impoverished.
Judge Posner's defense of markets is unrigorous because the proposition
for which he would like our assent-that more markets yield more decent
116. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral
and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).
117. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 285.
118. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 3.
119. He has since repackaged this polemic as a textbook on the field he finds so
tedious. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (rev. & enlarged ed. 1998). He
apparently wishes that Literary Criticisms of Law had discussed this book more (and
everyone else's books less). Posner, supra note 2, at 195-96, 202.
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societies-is so hopelessly vague. It purports to array all societies before us on
a single axis, but it does not really do so, because the concept of a market is so
diffuse. Markets are not the mere absence of law, since they require a
distribution of entitlements, and rules for identifying and enforcing voluntary
transactions and for identifying and preventing involuntary transactions. Like
the idea of democracy, the idea of the market is self-limiting. Thus
majoritarian democracy requires ground rules that limit how majorities can
distribute political power: otherwise majorities may subvert democracy by
disfranchising, silencing, or even annihilating minorities. Similarly, markets
require ground rules that set limits on how transactions can distribute economic
power. Accordingly, Judge Posner's readers are unlikely to conclude that
social decency precisely correlates with commodification: They will oppose
slavery, bribery, and blackmail, and will wish to retain family attachments.,,
The market societies that we accept as decent are mixed societies, with
regulation, social welfare, public services, nonprofit sectors, professions, and
myriad organizations such as firms, families, schools, churches and clubs,
within which goods are not allocated on the basis of price.121 Markets exist in
the interstices among these legal structures, and their boundaries define realms
of meaning. 2 These mixed societies vary along too many dimensions to
permit the kind of single-axis comparison that Judge Posner's pragmatic
argument for allocative efficiency presupposes.
The general propositions that markets enhance wealth and that wealth is
useful do not justify the conclusion that wealth should be maximized, and do
not tell us how to weigh wealth against the expressive values we inevitably
support or undermine when we define and regulate markets. Nobody thinks all
Pareto optimal allocations of resources yield acceptably decent societies, and
this means that societal decency must factor in other criteria besides allocative
efficency.'- Indeed, Pareto optimal allocations of resources are not even
120. Posner concedes this. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 375-77
(admitting that even if prosperity could be promoted by enslavement, it would still be
antithetical to Americans' moral intuitions); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra
note 36, at 30-31 (qualifying law and economics theory with the reminder that "there is more
to justice than economics").
121. Again, as Posner admits:
All modem societies depart from the precepts of wealth maximization. The unanswered
question is how the conditions in these societies would change if the public sector could
somehow be cut all the way down to the modest dimensions of the night watchman state that
the precepts of wealth maximization seem to imply.
POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 387. This statement is even less precise than it
appears, since it misleadingly implies that there is some single, determinate model, "the
night watchman state" that the principles of wealth maximization entail. Would such a state
permit self-sale? Markets in convict labor? Extortion? Would it specifically enforce
contracts?
122. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 5-9.
123. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 36, at 15 (warning that
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necessarily more wealth enhancing than all less "efficient" alternatives, 24
which is why Judge Posner substitutes Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, or "potential"
Pareto superiority for Pareto optimality, as a policy standard.12
In sum, Judge Posner's pragmatic argument for wealth maximization asks
us to render an aesthetic judgment about alternative societies, imagined at the
crudest possible level of detail, effacing all the distributive and expressive
details. Because he has not rendered the alternative societies with any
precision or concreteness, there is very little for aesthetic judgment to operate
upon. Instead of accepting the aesthetic responsibilities of cultural criticism, he
attempts to cover up the flabbiness of his normative arguments by affecting a
brisk tone of self-professed tough-mindedness, saturated with self-flattering
adjectives like "efficient" and "practical."
Judge Posner's putatively instrumental values are actually aesthetic. While
I don't object to the fact that Judge Posner appeals to aesthetic value, I do
object to the lazy imprecision and the stealth of that aesthetic appeal, and I
think these two vices are connected. Thus my claim is that Judge Posner
permits himself his aesthetic imprecision by presenting his values as purely
instrumental, and by trivializing aesthetic concerns. But aesthetic valuation is
unavoidable in legal reasoning, so that Judge Posner's aesthetic of efficiency is
just one example of the pervasive role of aesthetic value in normative legal
argument.
In a modem society, law is understood to be a creature of human will
designed to serve human needs. 26 Law's content is seen as a function of the
utility or choice of human beings or their institutional representations. Legal
argument and decision therefore involve prospective reasoning about the
interests of persons, groups, populations, institutions, and polities; and
retrospective reasoning about the content and competence of their choices. In
other words, in a modem society, almost all of legal argument is about the
desires of legal actors, how best to measure, identify, or represent those desires,
and whose desires should count. In Literary Criticisms of Law, we claimed
that such argument depends on acts of literary imagination, fitting out these
legal actors with characters, narrative histories, commitments, callings, and
economics cannot determine whether efficient legal rules are socially or ethically desirable).
124. See, e.g., MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 107, at 185, 220-22 (showing that
some allocations within the Pareto frontier may produce more wealth and welfare than some
allocations at the Pareto frontier). Strictly speaking, any existing allocation of goods is
Pareto efficient by definition, otherwise transactions would reallocate goods. It is logically
impossible to derive an inefficient allocation in a fully specified microeconomic model. See
THRAINN EGGERTSSON, supra note 107, at 23-24; Steven N.S. Cheung, A Theory of Price
Control, 17 J.L. & ECON. 53, 71 (1974); John Umbeck & Mike Staten, Inefficiency: A
Logical and Empirical Impossibility, 7 Soc. SCd. REv. 1 (1986-87).
125. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 36, at 13-16.
126. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66-67 (1921).
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quests.
Prospective reasoning about the public interest or about social welfare
involves imagining and comparing the future histories of alternative
hypothetical societies, each with not only different legal regimes, but also
different populations with different values and interests.27 When different
societies have different histories and institutional structures, they are likely to
make available to their members quite disparate social identities and roles.
These disparate identities and roles will encourage members of differently
constituted societies to pursue different purposes and interests.
When we try to compare societies with different members, values, and
interests from the standpoint of social welfare we face imponderables. Is
Sweden better than Japan? For whom? Should you prefer a wealthier society
in which you would have a different family or personality? Should you prefer
a more peaceful society in which you would not exist? The choice among such
incommensurable alternatives is not the simple matter of calculation presumed
by cost benefit analysis.12 1 Such a decision requires us to choose among the
different personal, group, institutional, and societal identities that will shape the
preferences of future generations. We cannot hold their future preferences
fixed and choose policies that will best realize them. Instead, the design of the
future society, its membership, and its values is a necessarily expressive or
aesthetic choice we must make.
We face further value choices in reasoning about the future welfare of
society. We must choose distributive standards both within and across
generations. We must choose a time horizon: the future is infinite, our
knowledge of it finite and diminishing. Should we maximize the happiness of
the living, of the next generation, of all future generations? 29 We must choose
how to compare aggregate and average utility, and how to evaluate populations
of different sizes. 30 We must choose a geographic scope.'3 ' All these choices
are subjective. They are ours to make. We cannot simply enact the preferences
127. DEREK PARFrr, REASONS AND PERSONS 351-64 (1989) (pointing out that "our
identity in fact depends on when we were conceived" so that alternative policies, in so far as
they effect when persons are conceived, alter the composition of society. The result is that
alternative policies cannot be compared by reference to their welfare consequences for the
same people.).
128. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 44-73
(1993); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 106-24 (1986); JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 321-66
(1986); SUNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 70-107; Nick Smith, Incommensurability and Alterity in
Contemporary Jurisprudence, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 503 (1997).
129. HERZOG, supra note 6, at 125-32 (showing that different time horizons can yield
very different conclusions about which policies maximize utility).
130. PARFIT, supra note 127, at 381-441 (1989) (exploring the difficulties utilitarians
face in balancing population size against standard of living).
131. Binder & Smith, supra note 21, at 222-24.
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of future people, because we must decide which future people to consult, and
what preferences they will have. These decisions inevitably depend on our
value choices, which are interpretive and creative responses to the identities,
roles, and traditions we have inherited. We express ourselves in making these
choices. We fashion a design for the future that is our best vision of how to
continue the historical narrative we have inherited.
The unguided discretion we have to shape the future imposes a frightening
moral burden. In the face of the subjective, expressive, and arguably aesthetic
value choices of prospective policy making, it is tempting to revert to some
form of majoritarianism. If we cannot foist our responsibility to shape the
future onto the preferences of future generations, perhaps we can simply foist it
onto our fellow citizens. Why not simply enact the laws that the current
generation wants? This response confronts three difficulties. First, notions like
popular consent are incoherent without authoritative institutional definition;
second, institutional authority depends upon legitimating narratives; third, we
can only judge these narratives aesthetically.
Why does popular consent depend upon authoritative institutional
definition? The political theorist Stephen Holmes argues that unless
concretized in stable institutions, popular will is a pernicious fiction,
authorizing rule by urban mobs or vanguardist parties. 32 Relative to these
volatile and dictatorial social choice mechanisms, competitive elections
informed by public discussion are far more broadly representative. Yet,
Holmes argues, these relatively more democratic processes "are highly
artificial constructs, requiring patient acceptance of elaborate procedures,
institutions, rules .... For a society with millions of citizens.., there is no
such thing as a collective choice outside of all prechosen procedures and
institutions." 33 Holmes adverts here to the familiar paradoxes of social choice
theory according to which no social choice mechanism can assure a coherent
social preference-ordering of more than two altematives that is determined by
individual preference-orderings arrived at independently of the social choice
mechanism.' Inevitably, then, democratic will depends upon preexisting
political institutions. 35
But what, if not consent, legitimates these institutions? Such institutions
can only be rendered authoritative by means of a legitimating narrative. A
narrative of virtuous institutional origins is needed to cope with two familiar
132. HOLMES, supra note 59, at 9.
133. Id.
134. KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963) (setting forth
the famous "impossibility" theorem).
135. Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy:
Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121,
2197-98 (1990) (arguing that political institutions are preconditions to creating a collective
will).
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problems of liberal political theory: the problem of collective action and the
problem of political obligation.
The problem of collective action is said to arise among individuals who are
rationally self-interested, uncoerced and well-informed.' 36 Such persons have
no incentive to cooperate in producing or conserving public goods like
renewable resources, common defense, or security of entitlements. By
defecting, they can receive the benefits of the public good without bearing the
costs of its provision. Hence all will find it rational to defect, with the perverse
result that none will enjoy the public good. And so, the argument concludes,
government is needed to coerce free riders into cooperating to produce public
goods. Convinced by the security of government enforcement that one's fellow
citizens will cooperate in the provision of public goods, each citizen will
ungrudgingly cooperate in turn.
But this compliant attitude depends upon each citizen's faith in the
stability, effectiveness, and civic responsibility of the institutions charged with
enforcing cooperation. If government has already demonstrated these qualities
over a period of time-if it has a creditable past-such faith may be warranted.
But rational self-interest maximizers will be very skeptical of any government
that lacks such a pedigree. For, as Carol Rose has argued, government is itself
a public good requiring cooperation to establish. 37 So government arguably
could never come into existence among people who were uncoerced, rationally
self-interested, and well-informed, even if they desired it.
Launching a government therefore requires either prior coercion, or
altruism, or myth. By altruism, I mean a disposition to cooperate regardless of
the defection of free riders. By myth I mean faith that others will cooperate in
obeying and defending government when this has not been proven by
experience. Typically, myth takes the form of an invented past characterized
by heroic altruism or solidaristic cooperation.
Of course, modem liberal states do not actually arise as a result of
uncoerced contracting among rationally self-interested individuals. Instead,
they emerge out of traditional societies ordered by myth, tribal loyalty, and
authoritarian governance. Rationally self-interested individuals devoid of
solidaristic commitments and authoritarian belief systems are only likely to
arise in an up-and-running modem state. And they are only likely to seize
control of that state if they organize-in other words, only if they can be
mobilized to engage in collective action by some mythology of solidarity or
altruistic virtue.
Some element of solidarity or heroic virtue must be part of the justificatory
136. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 1-3 (1971).
137. Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory,
Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 51-52 (1989).
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ideology of such a revolutionary movement for two reasons: First, to solve the
collective action problem by explaining why rational people should stake their
lives and fortunes on an unproven government. Second, to solve the political
obligation problem by explaining why these rational revolutionaries have a
right to revolt, but their successors do not. Thus, as Robert Cover argued, the
point of legal narrative is that "[e]very legal order must conceive of itself in
one way or another as emerging out of that which is itself unlawful," and that
this original transgression "always provides the typology for a dangerous
retum."1
38
The liberal state cannot induce cooperation and provide public goods
unless it is stable. But it cannot promise stability if it holds that citizens are
only bound to obey law as long as they consent to do so. The disenchanted
liberal individual, loyal only to his own property, cannot by himself sustain the
polity that protects it. His security paradoxically-and parasitically-depends
on the solidaristic commitment of others. Thus the authority of the liberal state
can never be explained by reference to consent alone. To solve the problem of
political obligation, the narrative mythology of the liberal state must offer a
reason why the consent of the founders binds their successors. To distinguish
the founding exercise of will from future defections, it must be remembered as
virtuous, motivated by altruism rather than selfishness. As Dworkin's theory
of law as integrity implies, the popular "consent" which legitimates new laws is
not purely a matter of will: It is a matter of keeping faith with virtues that a
patriotic mythology ascribes to a political founding.139 When we make law, we
do not simply reveal preference: we exercise the authority of office. Our
consent can only authorize law if we have first characterized ourselves as
authoritative, in an act of literary imagination. 40
To sum up: In modem society, legal arguments depend on representations
of human will, taking the form of judgments about future social welfare or past
popular consent. Yet these representations are not simply mimetic, because
social welfare and popular will are constituted in the very act of representing
them. The process by which we represent our society's will and welfare in the
medium of law is an imaginative and expressive one, narrating the path from a
virtuous past to a decent future, and informed by aesthetic judgment as well as
instrumental reason. In Literary Criticisms of Law, Bob Weisberg and I
reasoned that because law is inherently literary in this sense, legal and literary
138. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, Forward to the Supreme Court, 1982
Tenn, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4,23 (1983).
139. DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 225-28.
140. JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 138-40 (1986)
(arguing that agenda-setting rules and other procedural mechanisms clothe voters with
authority to act as representatives of the polity); Jacques Derrida, "Declarations of
Independence," 15 NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE 9 (1986) (describing how the Declaration of
Independence and other foundational documents constitute the popular sovereigns whose
authority they invoke).
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scholars can use the methods of literary criticism to "read" the law and to
subject it to critical evaluation and reflective aesthetic judgment.
That is why the "literary" thinking that Judge Posner disdains as useless to
law is, in fact, necessary to it. The exercise of aesthetic judgment is an
unavoidable aspect of the normative evaluation and reform of law. The self-
conscious, reflective exercise of aesthetic judgment is, as Nietzsche insisted, a
moral duty.14' To shirk that duty, as Judge Posner permits himself to do, is
"self-indulgent."
141. ALEXANDER NEHAMAS, NIErZsCHE: LIFE AS LITERATURE 8, 38-39, 226-34 (1985);
BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 469-72.
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